Amar's Bill of Rights: The Misappropriation of the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment, in many respects, is the closest thing to a right to privacy that can be found in our federal Constitution. This Amendment has become the bulwark of personal security and liberty in our country, even as we struggle to understand the limits our security should place on our liberty and the imposition that technology places on both. But in Chapter 4 of his book The Bill of Rights, Akhil Reed Amar argues that the Founders were not primarily building an individual right to security and privacy in the Fourth Amendment, rather they were providing another tool for civil juries to keep oligarchical and repressive governments in check.

Let's walk through Amar's development of his argument because, even if we do not wish to adopt the Founders' interpretation of the Fourth Amendment -- after all, there is a place for a right to privacy in our constitutional structure -- there are principles the Founders' view of the Fourth Amendment have to teach us.

The Fourth Amendment reads as follows:

 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The use of the word "people" in this Amendment rings with echoes of the context of the other Amendments employing this word -- the First, Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. This is the clarion call to the sovereignty of "We, the People of the United States." Amar imagines what the Amendment might mean for us if we take this popular sovereignty perspective alone in its interpretation:

 

On one reading, the amendment's language of "the people" could be read as reminding us that we must be especially watchful of government efforts to use search-and-siezure powers to interfere with people's political activities -- circulating petitions (literally the people's papers), attending political meetings (with the literal persons), assembling in a constitutional convention (which might be seen as a house of the people), and so on. But without more, this reading seems a bit too cute; surely, the main "houses" to be protected here are private abodes, not public assemblies.

Amar argues that the 1763 English case Wilkes v. Wood must have served as an influence for Madison:

 

Wood involved a famous cast of characters -- both the target of the government, John Wilkes, and the author of the opinion, Lord Chief Charles Pratt (soon to become Lord Camden), became folk heroes in the colonies.... Wilkes, a champion of the people and a member of Commons, had used the press to communicate with his constituents and criticize George III's ministry and majesty. When the government reacted by trying to use general warrants to suppress his political activity, breaking into his house and rummaging through his personal papers, Wilkes brought suit in Wood and successfully challenged the legality of those warrants. Wilkes also brought suit to challenge the "seizure" of his "person." (The government had imprisoned him in the Tower of London.) In a companion case to Wood, the lord chief justice ordered Wilkes released on habeas corpus on the ground of his Parliamentary privilege from arrest.

Madison quickly turns from the "political to the personal, from the 'the people' out-of-doors in conventions and suchlike to "persons" very much indoors in their private homes."

 

Yet even here, in taking the familiar talk of individual rights, we must be wary of anachronism and must not automatically assume that the right was essentially countermajoritarian. As with virtually every Bill of Rights provision thus far examined, the Fourth Amendment evinces at least as much concern with the agency problem of protecting the people generally from self-interested government policy as with protesting minorities against majorities of fellow citizens. A self-dealing and oligarchic government, after all, could threaten rights of the people collectively by singling out certain persons -- opposition leaders like John Wilkes, for example -- for special abuse. To counter this and other threats, the Fourth and Seventh Amendments armed civil juries, drawn from "the people," with special weapons to protect both individual persons and the collective people against a possibly unrepresentative and self-serving officialdom.

Reflect, for a moment, on the fact that the Fourth Amendment actually contains two different commands. First, all government searches and seizures must be reasonable. Second, no warrants shall issue without probably cause. The modern Supreme Court has intentionally collapsed the two requirements, treating all unwarranted searches and seizures -- with various exceptions, such as exigent circumstances -- as per se unreasonable. Otherwise, the Court has reasoned, the requirement that a neutral magistrate verify probable cause ex ante would be obviously frustrated -- the special safeguards of the warrant clause would be all but meaningless.

But this conflation of the warrant clause with the probable cause clause is not what the amendment says and effectively rewrites the amendment by adding a second sentence: "Absent special circumstances, no search or seizure shall occur without a warrant."

Amar invites us to rethink our assumptions:

 

To begin rethinking, consider the paradigmatic way in which Fourth Amendment rights were to be enforced at the Founding. Virtually any search or seizure by a federal officer would involve a physical trespass under common-law principles. An aggrieved target could use the common law of trespass to bring suit for damages against the official -- just as Wilkes brought a trespass action against Wood. If the search or seizure were deemed lawful in court, the defendant would prevail; but if, as in Wood, the search were found lawful, the defendant government official would be held strictly liable. There was no such thing as "good faith" immunity.

The problem with the Supreme Court's modern approach is that the proper role of the jury is displaced, and the role of citizens to act as a check on the professional judiciary and powerful magistrates has been hijacked. General warrants are too, well, general, and the ability of juries to review facts and determine appropriate awards and damages for cases in which they deem rights were violated is compromised. As in our loss of understanding of the militia, the modern jury is a sad shadow of its former energetic self and fundamental structural principles of the original Constitution have been lost.

Amar's Bill of Rights: The Military Amendments

In considering the constitutional state of war powers a few years back, I worried that "executive excesses would probably be tied to [the president using the military domestically], as might be the case if a President sought dictatorial powers through the imposition of martial law." At the time, I was not prepared to offer a structural solution to prevent such a calamity, and for good reason. Smarter people than I have pondered this problem before me, including the Founding Fathers.

Their solution to the question was in the way they structured the Union's military system. A standing, professional army as a dangerous concept to the Founding generation, having just fought the Revolutionary War to throw off the oppresive yoke of the British. Alexander Hamilton notes the danger in The Federalist 28:

 

[I]f the persons instrusted with supreme power become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which [the nation] consists, having no distinct government each, can take no regular measures for defense. The citizens must rush tomultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource....

The answer for the Founders was to be found in federalism, and the militia under the command and control of the state governments. Jon Roland helpfully reviews the original constitutional meaning of "militia", which is important when considering that the Constitution in Article 1, section 8, clause 16 gives States the power of "Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."

Amar expands this thought on page 50 of his book The Bill of Rights:

 

in the event of central tyrrany, state governments could do precisely what colonial governments had done at Lexington and Concord and Bunker Hill: organize and mobilize their citizens into an effective fighting force capable of besting even a large standing army.

Amar quotes Madison in The Federalist 46, which is worth repeating here to drive home the point of just how much the Founders were counting on the local militia:

 

[T]he State governments with the people on their side would be able to repel the danger.... [A standing army] would be opposed [by] a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen among themselves, fighting for their common liberties and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence.

The standing, professional army of the eighteenth century was often a hoarde of foreign mercenaries that had no allegiance or fealty to the people in the local countryside where they were ordered to fight. The very structure of the militia meant that it was composed of family members and neighbors who lived and worked together. Already tightly knit and bound to return to life together after war, the militia was bound together by trust and need, so picking their own leaders among them helped tighten their cohesion.

Yet this federalism check on military adventurism by the central government did not quell the objections of the Anti-Federalists. Many pointed out that Congress still had power "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia." The Second Amendment was designed to limit congressional manipulation of the militia and leave them available to arming by the State governments.

While the meaning of militia has morphed over 200 years, the core concepts of the Second Amendment are still applicable: the militia was composed of all the people capable of bearing arms, so "the people", subjects of the federalism-based rights of the First Amendment, are also the subjects of the Second Amendment. And, as Amar argues, the "well-regulated" can't mean the power to disarm, as this was the very power it sought to keep away from Congress. Localism was the very heart of the militia system and for that reason, along with the experiences of the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment that relied on standing armies to preserve the Union against the tyranny and abuses of localities and states (ironically the opposite experience of the Founders), there is good reason to incorporate the Second Amendment against the states.

As an aside, Amar also argues that the conscription is unconstitutional because Congress circumvents the power of the State governments to appoint the officers of the militia and training the militia. "Under this reading, the federal government cannot directly force ordinary citizens into it's army, but state governments can conscript, organize, and train their respective citizens -- the militia -- who can in times of emergency be called into national service." (p 53)

The Third Amendment also acts to support civilian values against an overbearing military, working to subordinate the military to the civil power. Amar writes:

 

No standing army in peacetime can be allowed to dominate civilian society, either openly or by subtle intimidation. The Second Amendment's militia could thwart any open military usurpation - say, a siege - but what about more insidious forms of military occupation, featuring federal soldiers cowing civilians by psychological guerilla warfare, day by day, house by house? Bostonians who had lived under the hated Quartering Act of 1774 knew that this was no hypothetical. Hence the Third Amendment was needed to deal with military threats too subtle and stealthy for the Second's "well-regulated Militia." (p. 59)

Modern jurisprudence has a tendency to use the Third Amendment to construct rights of privacy for the individual, but the original context of the Third Amendment placed further limits on Congress' conscription power and further enforced separation of powers between the legislative and the executive. Congress' conscription power was restricted because if civilians could not be impressed upon to limited service as Innkeepers and cooks for soldiers, then what sense does it make that civilians can be pressed into full military service? Separation of powers were further defined because it took Congress, not the executive, "in a manner prescribed by law" to conscript a person's house.

So we see that the Second and Third Amendments work together to subordinate the military to the civilian power and to place checks against the executive's misappropriation of the military for his own purposes. Combined with Congress' complete power to raise and govern the military and to declare war, the Founders erected a wonderfully symbiotic system to ensure that all parts of society truly believed war was necessary before the nation was committed to war and, once it was, that the military would be used in a responsible manner.

Some argue that is was necessary for the United States to evolve away from the militia system in order to become a great power. The Bible reminds us that Israel abandoned its reliance on God to anoint a King "like all the nations." If we want to wield power "like all the nations," then in order to not become serfs to tyranny "like all the nations", the people of the United States must insist on a symbiotic system of checks and balances around our modern-day war powers for our military arrangements, just as the Founders did for their own. Yet another lesson we have forgotten in our modern rush for convenience, efficiency and power.

 

Amar's Bill of Rights: the Founder's Second Amendment that became #27

Money, who has it, and who should get to spend it are pervasive questions that haunt every generation. From Jesus' warning that "you will always have the poor with you" (Matthew 26:11) to our Founding Fathers to today, society and government have always struggled to find the proper balance between preserving liberty and freedom and providing the proper level of coverage (e.g., of food, clothing, shelter) for the poor and dispossessed.

Congress controls the purse strings for the federal government, so, through the legislative process, it sets the priorities for the nation. This is a lot of power to provide one institution, especially if it is not representative of the People. The Founders provided for frequent elections in an attempt to ensure Congress was representative, but they also provided several constitutional mechanisms to guard against the agency problem. Sourcing the House and Senate from different societal constituencies was one way; the presidential veto was another; judicial review a third.

Madison presented an additional structural safe-guard to the First Congress in the form of the second of the twelve initial proposed amendments to the Constitution. Amar briefly considers the amendment in his book The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction, highlighting its place behind the amendment expanding congressional size as further proof that the original Bill of Rights was more concerned with preserving majority rights against oppressive central government than about protecting repressed and disenfranchised minorities.

Madison's second amendment sought to control the rules under which Congress could grant itself a pay raise: "Article the second.... No law, varying the compensation for services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened." Coupled with the emolument clause of Article 1, Section 6, this amendment sought to clearly assign responsibility and hold government officials accountable to the People through elections.

Madison's second amendment was only ratified by by six states in the 1790's; this is perhaps indicative of the very agency problem Madison was fighting - how could state legislatures pass this amendment without triggering demand within their own states for a similar amendment in their state's constitution? But this Rip Van Winkle amendment survived into the 1990's when it received the requisite three-fourths of States to become the Twenty-Seventh Amendment of our Constitution.

Amar's Bill of Rights: the Founder's First Amendment

Before we venture into the Bill of Rights that is familiar to us, let us examine what Akhil Reed Amar has to say in his book The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction about the amendment that James Madison listed as first in the First Congress:

Article the first.... After the first enumeration required by the first Article of the Constitution, there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after which, the proportion shall be regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less that one hundred Representatives, not less that one Representative for every forty thousand persons, until the number of Representatives shall amount to two hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, not more than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons.

This proposed amendment was passed by the Congress and proposed to the States, but it fell one state short of the requisite three-fourths needed to ratify it. We shall examine why in a moment, but its failure to be ratified means it is obscure to many in this day and age. Nevertheless, its prominence on the list of so many weighty amendments reveals the importance the Founding generation placed on erecting proper safeguards in the government structure to ensure the liberty and rights of society. While we are used to the federal government, especially the courts, championing and advancing the rights and freedoms of the people, the federal government was still unproven in 1787. Anti-Federalist fears were centered around the small size of the House of Representatives and the lack of a Bill of Rights that would explicitly remove certain areas from Congress' purview of legislation.

Probably the deepest Anti-Federalist objection to the Constitution was that the document took the skimming principle too far: Congress was too small, too rich, too "refined." Indeed, this structural concern underlay most of the Anti-Federalists' other arguments. Because the legislature was so small, the Anti-Federalists feared that only great men with reputations spanning wide geographic areas could secure election. [Amar 10-11]

So the Anti-Federalists fell squarely in line with the views of traditional replublicanism, classically expressed by Montesquieu:

It is natural for a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise it cannot long subsist. In an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too considerable to be placed in any single subject; he has interests of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious, by oppressing his fellow-citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country.

In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have less extent, and, of course, are less protected. [Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, Book 8, Ch. 16]

The Federalists knew that this was a legitimate concern, and Madison, Hamilton, and John Jay, famed authors of The Federalist Papers, devoted the first section of their work to this topic. Madison's Federalist No. 10 is today a great treatise on the implementation of a Republic over a great mass of land and people, but extensive republics were untried in the eighteenth century, and it was far from certain that the scheme as laid out in the new Constitution would work. So Madison sought a compromise with the Anti-Federalists and proposed his First Amendment that increased the size of the House from that prescribed in Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution: "the Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand" constituents.

So if the proposed amendment would increase the size of the House and this was such a burning concern, why did the amendment fail to obtain ratification? According to Amar, several reasons present themselves:

• The amendment's mathematical formula made little sense and introduced too great of a complexity. The word "more" was strangely substituted for the word "less" in the last sentence of the amendment: "not more than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons." Unless the U.S. population rose from 8 to 10 million in the first decade, this provision would have proved inconsistent with the requirement preceding in the same clause, that there "not be less than two hundred Representatives".


• What the amendment gave in the short-run - a larger House - it took away in the longer run. The final clause established a maximum on the House's size, rather than a minimum. Whether Madison purposefully slipped in this language to enforce a maximum size, we can only speculate. His original wording did include a maximum size, but Congress had rejected that idea. Perhaps he saw an opportunity to reintroduce the maximum principle once he was on the conference committee for the twelve proposed amendments. After all, Madison was quite clear of his philosophy on the proper size of a legislative body in Federalist No. 10:
  

  
  It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects.
  



• Small state like Delaware (which ratified the ten amendments that did pass) might have been seeking to preserve the advantage a smaller House provided them. Since every state is guaranteed at least one Representative in the House, increasing the size of the House would have diluted the voting power of a small state.

Regardless, if Madison's First Amendment had become our First Amendment, it would be harder for us to miss the fact that the original Bill of Rights was more concerned with governmental structure than it was about individual and minority rights. If that had been the case, the Bill would begin and end (in the form of our Tenth Amendment) with articles unmistakeably added to deal with structural issues.

Amar's Bill of Rights

Akhil Reed Amar's book The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction is a fascinating walk, first, through the first ten amendments of the Constitution and, second, the Bill of Rights as recast through the prism of the 14th Amendment. Through this series of posts, I want to look at some of the perspectives Amar brings to each of the first ten amendments - first as the Founders would have expected each amendment to be interpreted after ratification in 1787 and, second, through their refinement by the Radical Republicans in 1866 through the 14th Amendment.

In our world in which the Bill of Rights is viewed as a bulwark of protection for minority rights against over-aggressive majorities, we have lost sight of the fact that the Founding generation was more concerned about protecting their liberties against an over-aggressive central government and standing army. Having just fought and won a Revolution against the British Empire because of the onerous policies and taxes passed by Parliament, the first twelve amendments proposed by James Madison in the First Congress were designed to shore up the structure of the federal government through strengthening the structures of federalism, localism, and majoritarian control of government.

This perspective was skewed by the experiences of slavery, the oppression that State governments practiced on their people in their defense of that sorry institution, and the stabilizing role that the Union Army played in preserving both liberty and union. We live under a Constitution that was nationalized by the Fourteenth Amendment, but we cannot understand what this means until we understand how the first ten amendments of the Constitution functioned before the Civil War.