The Salve of Time

In his book Constitutional Reform and Effective Government, James L. Sundquist considers constitutional reforms that would enable the branches of the U.S. government to work together more effectively, particularly the political branches - the Senate, the House and the president. His premises are that (1) the constitutional structure of our government encourages conflict and debate and this can be bad, but worse, (2) the cycle of our elections leaves our government open to debilitating crisis. One of his less-radical proposed solutions is to add some form of "safety valve" available to the president and the Congress in the event that they are hopelessly deadlocked on some major issue or the president is so unpopular that keeping him in office is detrimental to the country. After exploring several alternatives, Sundquist settles on giving the president or a constitutional majority (a majority of total membership) of either the House or the Senate the power to call special elections, in which the total membership of both houses of Congress and the presidency would be up for election for full terms. The idea is that this would give one of the three players the option to throw everything to the People so that Washington could be "reset," thereby resolving the issue causing deadlock (either disagreement on an issue or an unpopular or ineffective president) and enabling the government to return to effective collaboration.

Part of me is drawn to this type of proposal. It has a certain resemblance to the safety valve available in parliamentary systems in which the legislature can hold a vote of no-confidence in the Government, in which case the government ministers must resign or the head of state must dissolve the legislature and call for new elections. If a Government has become ineffective or a prime minister unpopular, then there is a mechanism to relieve the pressure and let the People speak through new elections.

This is the type of mechanism that Sundquist is looking to apply to the American context. Neverthless, a larger part of me doubts the wisdom of such a proposal. Time is the safety valve that the Founders built into the American constitutional system. With the entire House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate elected every two years, elections are close enough together to (theoritically) keep our representatives and senators accountable and responsive to the People. If it be a mid-term election, the People can give the president more power if they approve of his job performance by giving him more supporters in Congress, or the People can diminish and cripple the president if they disapprove of his job performance by giving the Opposition the majority in Congress, as happened in the elections last November. A congressional Opposition majority can do a lot to thwart an ambitious president (e.g., derail his domestic priorities or defund his foreign initiatives). The worst that can result is an ineffective government, which I do not think is necessarily a bad thing.

If there be any weakness with the American system, however, it is the possibility of a bad, ineffective, or unpopular president remaining in power for two or three years until the next presidential election. Short of an impeachment (which this country sees as a traumatic, destabilizing, debilitating act) or the provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment for removing a disabled president, there is no way to force a president from office for "maladministration" (however that term is defined). This design serves a purpose of allowing the president time to govern without constantly being beset by looming elections. If a president truly needs to be forcibly removed from office, I can't think of a situation that impeachment or the Twenty-fifth Amendment wouldn't cover. As noted above, maladministration can still be countered by giving the Opposition the majority in Congress at the mid-term election or voting the president out of office at the next presidential election.

If it is only deadlock between the president and Congress that needs to be relieved, only three years at a maximum (assuming a president usually gets most of what he wants during his first year in office) would pass until the next election. Many people point to the inability to remove President Bush from office now as "proof" that some sort of mechanism is needed to force his early exit, but the People elected him to a second term in 2004. He also still retains a base of support that enables him to effectively govern and build political coalitions. At some point, the People deserve the Government they elected, and they have to live with it.

It would seem that proposals such as Sundquist's calling of special elections would introduce ineffective government through the constant threat of new elections. It would seem that such a proposal would lead to debilitation if special elections are called more often than Sundquist thinks (i.e., once or twice in a century). Politicians would be constantly campaigning, lea ing little or no time for actual governance. Democracies in Italy and Israel are notoriously unstable because the Government does not have the distance necessary from the People to allow it to do unpopular things that are necessary from time to time when governing is necessary.

If a president needs to be removed, Congress should take the political risk necessary to impeach him. Or the provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment should be envoked. Otherwise, allow the salve of time to work its magic.

Legislation is...

Revision 2:
Laws define the borders that society has staked around its principles. If mores were cattle, legislation is the fence that protects them from the untamed wild.

Revision 1:
Laws define the borders that society has staked around its principles. If mores were cattle, legislation is the fence that limits their range.

Original:
Legislation is the embodiment of the borders society has staked around is principles. If moors were cattle, legislation is the fence that defines the limits of their range.
--Kelly French