Proposed Amendment #3: Balanced-Budget Veto Amendment

The Text:

Section 1. For purposes of this article, the budget of the United States for any given fiscal year shall be deemed unbalanced whenever the total amount of the debt of the United States held by the public at the close of such fiscal year is greater than the total amount of the debt of the United States held by the public at the close of the preceding fiscal year.

Section 2. If the budget of the United States is unbalanced for any given fiscal year, the President may separately approve, reduce, or disapprove any monetary amounts in any legislation that appropriates or authorizes the appropriation of any money drawn from the Treasury, other than money for the legislative and judicial branches of the United States Government, and which is presented to the President during the next annual session of Congress.

Section 3. Any legislation that the President approves with changes pursuant to section 2 of this article shall become law as modified. The President shall return with objections those portions of the legislation containing reduced or disapproved monetary amounts to the House where such legislation originated, which may then, in the manner prescribed under section 7 of Article I for bills disapproved by the President, separately reconsider those reduced or disapproved monetary amounts.

Section 4. The Congress shall have the power to implement this article by appropriate legislation.

Section 5. This article shall take effect on the first day of the next annual session of Congress following its ratification.

Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by Congress.

The Problem:
After a brief period of budget surpluses in the late 1990's, Congress returned to excessive deficits in this first decade of the twenty-first century. This mostly uninterrupted pattern of budget deficits are fueled by large-scale fear of tax hikes and congressional unwillingness to cut spending and pork, and it has become apparent that this is an institutional problem. The only constitutional check to control congressional-spending binges is the presidential veto, but it has proven too blunt and clumsy of an instrument. The item veto is a solution that has worked with some degree of effectiveness at the State level, but even its potential impact on budget discipline would be minimal without some sort of incentive built in for Congress to impose this needed discipline on its own.


The Explanation:
Rather than attempt to explain the need for this amendment, I'll defer to this excellent analysis offered by the CATO Institute.